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Forgey: Real Property - Wyoming's Private Road Statutes: Approaching a De

REAL PROPERTY-Wyoming's Private Road Statutes: Approaching
A Dead End? Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 1995).

In 1984, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. (Ferguson) owned Sections 18 and
19 of real property situated on the Laramie/Albany County border.' On
October 19, 1984, Ferguson conveyed Section 19 to a third party without
an easement or right of way that provided access to Section 19.2 Ferguson
maintained ownership of Section 18, which is directly north of Section
19? On March 1, 1987, the third party conveyed Section 19 to Edward
F. Murray, Jr. (Murray) and William J. Edwards (Edwards). 4
Due to a lack of access from their property in Section 19 to a public
road, Murray and Edwards applied to the Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County (Board) for a private road.' Murray and Edwards
sought a private road across the northeast comer of Section 30 (immediately south of Section 19), owned by John and Gladys Lindt, to connect a
proposed subdivision in Section 19 with a public road to the south.' At
this point, a conflict developed. The dispute centered on whether Murray
and Edwards were without legally enforceable access under Wyoming's
private road statutes.
In 1987, the Board decided that because Murray and Edwards had
no outlet to, or connection with, a public road from Section 19, a private
road was necessary to afford them such access.' The Board found that
both Ferguson (to the north) and the Lindts (to the south) previously
denied Murray and Edwards access across each's property.! It reasoned
that, because a private road across the Ferguson property would entail
condemning approximately one mile of private road, and that such a road

1. Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 288 (Wyo. 1991). The county border

splits the sections in halves from north to south, the eastern half of each section situated in Laramie
County. Brief of Appellee at App. #1, Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-160)

[hereinafter Brief of Appellee].
2. Ferguson Ranch, Inc., 811 P.2d at 288.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 2.
6. Brief of Appellant at 4, Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-160) [herein-

after Brief of Appellant]. The Lindts own the northeast one-quarter of Section 30. Messrs. Cole and
Kollal own the southeast one-quarter of Section 30, and verbally agreed to allow Murray and Edwards access across this property. Such access would connect to Crystal Lake Road, which is a public
road in Laramie County. Id. at App. 7.
7. Id. at App. #7.

8. Id.
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would be situated mostly in Albany County, the most convenient location
for a private road would be across the Lindts' property. 9 Pursuant to the
private road statutes, the Board ordered the requisite viewers and appraisers to assemble, locate the private road, and assess damages against
Murray and Edwards. 10
The viewers and appraisers located the
Lindts' property and assessed damages against
the amount of $33,600." The Board formally
road be established in accordance with Wyoming

private road across the
Murray and Edwards in
ordered that the private
24-9-101,
Statute section
12

and adopted the viewers and appraisers' damage assessment.

Both parties appealed the Board's establishment order to the district
court.13 The Lindts appealed the order to question the necessity of the
private road.' 4 Murray and Edwards appealed to contest the Board's
damage assessment.' 5
Murray and Edwards voluntarily requested that the district court
dismiss their appeal due to substantial changes in their proposed use of
the land, so that they might pursue alternative access to the north across

Ferguson's land via an easement by necessity.' 6 Pursuant to Murray and
Edwards' request, the district court dismissed both parties' appeals, with-

out objection from the Lindts."7

The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected Murray and Edwards' attempt to establish an easement by necessity across Ferguson's land.'" As a
result, the court reinstated both parties' prior appeals in the district
court. 19

9. Id. The Board estimated that a private road across the Lindts' property would involve onehalf mile of private road. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at App. #6. The viewers and appraisers first calculated the market value of the property
to be taken. Then, they added an assessment to compensate the Lindts for loss of privacy, inconvenience due to increased traffic and decreased capabilities, and the disturbance of livestock. Id.
12. Id. One commissioner dissented in the order, arguing that the assessed damages did not
adequately compensate the Lindts. The commissioner stated that, because of increased traffic due to
Murray and Edwards' proposed subdivision, the private road would interfere with the Lindts' ability
to successfully operate their cattle ranch. The dissenter advocated a higher damage award. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Ferguson Ranch, Inc., 811 P.2d at 288.
15. Id.
16. Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 461-62 (Wyo. 1995). The Wyoming Supreme Court held
that the only means Murray and Edwards could utilize to obtain this type of access was the private
road statutes. Ferguson Ranch, Inc., 811 P.2d at 289.
17. Ferguson Ranch, Inc., 811 P.2d at 288.
18. Id. at 289. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
19. Ferguson Ranch, Inc., 811 P.2d at 291.
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The district court affirmed the Board's original establishment of the
private road across the Lindts' property, but remanded the Board's damages determination.' On remand, the Board assessed damages at $436.00
using only the dollars-per-acre value that the viewers and appraisers
utilized in their initial damage assessment.21
The Lindts appealed the Board's remanded damages determination to
the district court, claiming that the damages were inadequate and procedurally defective.' The Lindts also argued that Murray and Edwards
possessed a pre-existing implied easement from Ferguson.23 The district
court affirmed the Board's $436.00 damage assessment, and rejected the
Lindts' implied easement argument. 24 The Lindts appealed this decision to
the Wyoming Supreme Court.
This casenote considers the status of Wyoming's private road statutes in the context of two issues presented in Lindt v. Murray:
-

Whether, following Lindt v. Murray, an implied
easement is relevant to the necessity of a private
road under the private road statutes, and

-

The proper application of the damages standard in pri-

vate road actions.
It considers what the Wyoming Supreme Court meant by the term
"implied easement" in Lindt, and what impact that meaning has on whether a private road is "necessary" under the private road statutes. This note
concludes that what the court meant by "implied easement" in Lindt was
"quasi easement," resulting in a lower standard of necessity to establish a
private road.
20. Lindt, 895 P.2d at 462. The district court ordered the Board to assess damages using the
standard found in Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423 (Wyo. 1982), based on before and
after market values of the land to be taken. The district court ordered the Board to not consider subjective factors such as inconvenience and injury to business conducted on the land in assessing damages. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6. at App. #5.
21. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at App. #2. The Board used the $200.00/acre land
value which the viewers and appraisers previously established. The Board determined that the
road across the Lindt property was .06 of one mile long by 30 feet wide, resulting in 95,040
feet being taken. The Board reasoned that 95,040 feet is approximately 2.18 acres, and at
$200.00/acre, the total damage amounted to $436.00. Id. This reduced the Board's initial assessment by approximately 98%. Id. at7.
22. Lindt, 895 P.2d at 462.
23. Id. Thus, the private road was not necessary.
24. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6,at App. #1. The district court also assessed both parties'
appeal costs against the Lindts pursuant to Wyoming law, ruling that there was no reasonable cause
for the appeal. Id.
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This casenote also considers the confusion in determining which
factors may be used to calculate damages under the private road statutes.
It concludes that Wyoming's Eminent Domain Act adds more certainty to
determining damages in private road actions.
BACKGROUND

A.

THE STATUTES

In 1895, the Wyoming legislature created a statutory process to
allow those whose land is without an outlet or connection to a public road
to establish such a connection by condemning a private road across
another's land. 5 The private road statutes fall under the state's general
power of eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the state's right and power to appropriate private
property to promote the general welfare.' The scope of eminent domain
extends to all cases where, by the state's authority, a corporation, the
state, or a private citizen takes another's property for a particular use
without the owner's consent. According to the Wyoming Supreme
Court, the policy behind the state's constitutional or statutory right to
condemn access across another's land is to avoid landlocking property and
rendering it useless.'
Wyoming's private road statutes allow a landowner to exercise the
state's eminent domain power to condemn a private road across another's
property in order to establish access between his property and a public
road. 9 Wyoming Statute section 24-9-101 states that:
Any person whose land has no outlet to nor connection with a
public road may apply to the board of county commissioners of
his county for a private road leading from his premises to some
convenient public road.'

STAT. §§ 24-9-101 to -104 (1993) is the current version of the private road statutes.
Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 410 (Wyo. 1979).

25. WYO.
26.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. WYo. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1993). A landowner may also utilize the state's eminent domain
power to condemn public access for a particular purpose using WyO. STAT. §§ 1-26-101 to -817
(1993).
30. The statute also requires the private road applicant to provide written notice of his intent to
apply for the private road to the owner, resident agent or occupant of all lands over which the private
road will exist. The applicant must provide such notice sixty days prior to when he submits his application to a Board. Publication may serve as notice to nonresident owners when no resident agent exists for the applicant to personally serve. WYo. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1993).
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The statute provides for a hearing, at which all interested parties
may be heard as to the necessity of the private road. 3 If the Board finds
that the applicant has complied with the statutes and that the private road
is necessary, the Board will appoint three disinterested freeholders and
electors of the county to serve as viewers and appraisers.32 The viewers
and appraisers are to meet, view, and locate the private road as they deem
appropriate, but in a way that does the least possible damage to the property which it crosses.33 Once the viewers and appraisers locate the private
road, they must assess the damages sustained by the owner of the property to be burdened by the private road.'
The Wyoming legislature intended for the private road statutes to
provide a local forum with a readily available, economically affordable, and time efficient method whereby a landowner can obtain a
means of access to his property.35 According to the Wyoming Supreme
Court, the private road statutes are conceptually rooted in easements
by necessity.36
B. Necessity
The word necessity has plagued the private road statutes and the
courts with confusion and uncertainty for many years. Confusion stems
from what makes a private road necessary under the private road statutes
and what consideration should be given to alternative remedies, including
easements by necessity and implied easements.37

31. Id. For a concise discussion and explanation of proper statutory procedure, see McGuire v.
McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1980). Due to the property rights involved in establishing a private
road, any affected landowner may appear before the commissioners to contest the establishment of the
private road or the viewers and appraisers' damage assessment. Carney v. Board of County Comn'rs
of Sublette County, 757 P.2d 556, 559 (Wyo. 1988) (citing Gold v. Board of County Conun'rs of
Teton County, 658 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1983)).
32. WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1993).
33. Id. The viewers and appraisers may not locate the private road across anyone's land that is
not included in the private road application. The private road may not exceed thirty feet in width. Id.
34. Id. WYO. STAT. § 24-9-102 (1993) gives the viewers and appraisers the authority to determine whether gates should be placed on the private road, and assess damages accordingly. WYo.
STAT. § 24-9-103 (1993) provides that a majority of the viewers and appraisers shall report their
findings and damages to the Board. If the Board is satisfied with this report and the applicant remits
payment for the costs of locating the road, the Board will declare the road as private and record the
road. The parties may then appeal the Board's action to the district court within thirty days. Id.
35. McGuire, 608 P.2d at 1288.
36. Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Wyo. 1989).
37. See Vance T. Countryman & Drew A. Perkins, Death of the Dark Ages? The Troubled
Law ofEasements in Wyoming, 27 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 151 (1992) [hereinafter Countryman].
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Generally, there are three types of easements: express, prescriptive, and implied. 8 Easements by necessity may constitute a fourth
type of easement, or a subset of implied easements, depending on
which view a particular jurisdiction follows. Express easements are
expressly granted from grantor to grantee. Prescriptive easements are
based on the open, visible, continuous hostile use of another's property. 39 Implied easements cover a variety of situations involving a conveyance of land which fails to explicitly specify an easement. 4 The
courts, then, recognize an implied easement to effectuate the prcs-med

intent of the parties to the conveyance.4 1
Implied easements generally exist in two different forms. A quasi
easement is implied when a grantor uses part of his land to serve another
dominant part of his land, and later severs the two parcels, leaving the
servient parcel without access. 42 An easement is also implied when land is
conveyed and described with reference to a plat or map to allow access to
the streets, parks, etc. that are shown on the plat or map. 43
Courts and scholars vary in how they characterize easements by
necessity.' Some characterize easements by necessity as an implied easement, based on the parties' intent at the time of conveyance.45 Others

38. 1 ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 6.02 (Arthur R.
Gaudio ed., 1994) [hereinafter GAUDIO].
39. Countryman, supra note 37, at 155.
40. GAUDIO, supra note 38, § 6.02[5][b].
41. Id.
42. Id. at § 6.02[5][b][i]. The casenote author uses the term "quasi" easement for semantic and
clarity purposes. Although the Corbettcase, infra, refers only to an "implied" easement, the elements
of the "implied" easement in Corbett are consistent with what scholars refer to as a "quasi" easement.
Id. In Wyoming, a quasi easement is established by: (1) Unitary ownership of the relevant parcels of
land, (2) A use must have been established in which one part or parcel of the land was subordinated
to another, (3) The use must be plainly and physically apparent by reasonable inspection, and (4) The
use must affect the value of the estate benefitted and must be necessary to the reasonable use of the
estate. Corbett v. Whitney, 603 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1979) (citation omitted).
43. GAUDIO, supra note 38, § 6.02[5][b][iii].
44. One element of an easement by necessity is unity of title
at some point between the dominant and servient estates. GAUDIO,supra note 38, § 6.02[5][b] at 6-29. Second. there must have been
a severance of the parcels from the unity of tile. 3 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, § 34.07 (rev. 1994) [hereinafter POWELL]. Third, reasonable or strict necessity must exist at the
time of severance. Id. at 34-67. Reasonable necessity is satisfied if alternative accesses to the property
would entail disproportionate expense or trouble. GAUDIO, supra note 38, § 6.02[51[b] at 6-31. Strict
necessity requires that the dominant estate have no means of access other than the claimed easement.
Id. at §6.02[5][b]. Necessity is not mere convenience. POWELL at 34-68. The precise standards for
strict and reasonable necessity vary somewhat by jurisdiction.
45. GAUDIO, supra note 38, § 6.02[5][b][ii]. See JAMES H. BACKMAN & DAVID A. THOMAS,
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DISPUTES BETWEEN ADJOINING LANDOWNERS-EASEMENTS, § 2.02[3][b]
(rev. 1992). Implied easements by necessity are based on the presumed intent of parties because
parties would rarely intend to render the conveyed property useless due to a lack of access. The
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characterize easements by necessity as a separate entity; a fourth type of
easement based solely on public policy.' Easements by necessity, unlike
quasi easements, do not require a prior apparent use. 7
The Wyoming Supreme Court laid the foundation for easements
by necessity in McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Company. 4s The plaintiff landowner claimed that because his livestock, located on public grazing land elsewhere, needed access to water on his
land, the court should establish an easement by necessity over adjacent
land to provide access from the grazing land to the plaintiff's land. 9
The court stated that the plaintiff could access a public highway which
provided him reasonable facilities for possessing, using and enjoying
his own premises." It held that the facts did not establish a cause of
action for an easement by necessity."
In Mcllquham, the court seemingly characterized easements by
necessity as a subset of implied easements, because it elaborated that
easements by necessity are based on an implied grant from the grantor to
the grantee. 2 According to the court, access across the grantor's land to
the grantee's newly acquired property is implied in the grantor's conveyance because the access is necessary for the grantee to use and enjoy his
property. 3
The status of easements by necessity became less certain following
Snell v. Ruppert.' In response to an application for a private road by a
subdivision lot owner whose access was cut off by other subdivision lots,
the county commissioners established a private road across adjacent nonsubdivision land." The adjacent landowner contended that the private road
was not necessary under the private road statutes because the private road
theory behind implied easements by necessity is that public policy favors the utilization of property.
GAUDIO, supra note 38, § 6.02[1[b][iil.
46. 2 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

§ 362 (rep. ed. 1980) [hereinafter THOMPSON]. According to this view, easements by necessity are
separate and distinct from implied easements because, although an implied easement is based on the
implied intent of the parties and necessity is a factor in determining this intent, easements by necessity
are based on public policy favoring the utilization of land. Id.
47. Id. at 385. See GAUDIO, supra note 38, § 6.02[5][b].
48. 104 P. 20 (Wyo. 1909).
49.

Id. at 29.

50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. Because the landowner had sufficient access to use and enjoy his property, an easement
was not necessary to provide him additional access.
52. Id. at 63.
53. Id. The access is viewed as a condition of the land sale. Countryman, supra note 37, at
156.
54. 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975).
55. Id. at 1044-45.
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applicant already possessed an easement by necessity via the subdivision
lots. 6 In addition, the adjacent landowner contended that an easement by
necessity is a condition precedent to applying for a private road. 7
According to the court, the common law required that a grantor
convey with his property whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of
the land. 8 This included ingress and egress over the grantor's remaining
land, which is presumed to have been the intent of both parties at the time
of conveyance.59

The court determined that when the parties intend to grant an easement by necessity in their conveyance, the easement is conveyed with the
land.' Therefore, the grantee does not anticipate compensating the grantor for the burden imposed by the easement. 6' The court held that the
Wyoming Constitution anticipates that burdened landowners will be compensated for access taken in the form of an easement by necessity.62 It
reasoned that because easements by necessity do not anticipate such compensation, the private road statutes, which do anticipate such compensation, abrogate easements by necessity. 3
The court also held that the private road statutes abrogated easements by necessity because such easements are inconsistent with the
Wyoming Constitution and the private road statutes.'
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1046.
58. Id.
59. Id. By this time courts shifted their focus to the contractual relationship between landowners. As a result, the theoretical focus on easements by necessity shifted from the implied grant theory
to whether the parties to a land transaction intended to grant an easement by necessity over the
grantor's land. The courts presume that access was a reasonable condition of the property sale and
that the parties intended such in the conveyance. Countryman, supra note 37, at 157.
60. Snell, 541 P.2d at 1046.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. As a result, an easement by necessity is not a prerequisite to applying for a private
road. The court referred to Wyo. CONST. art. I, §§ 32 and 33. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 32 states that
"[pirivate property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity . . . without due compensation." WYO. CONST. art. I, § 33 states that
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation." The court pointed to Arizona, Washington and Colorado, which have interpreted similar constitutional provisions to include easements by necessity. In those states, the legislature may define and
establish the procedure to make the right to access available. The court stated that when a statute
covers the whole subject matter, the abrogation of the common law on the same subject will be implied. Id. In Leo Sheep v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 680 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court, citing Snell, concluded that Wyoming no longer recognized easements by necessity.
64. Snell, 541 P.2d at 1046. The court determined that an easement by necessity implied that
the grantor consented to an easement across his property. According to the court, when several intervening grantors separate the severance of the property from the common grantor and a subsequent
grantee claiming an easement by necessity, the grantor's implied consent is contrary to the Wyoming
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This seems to be a clear holding, except that footnote four of the
opinion states "we do not foreclose the possibility that a common law way
of necessity can be imposed in a proper case where the isolated landowner
chooses that course."' This footnote is contrary to the court's opinion,
which held that the private road statutes abrogated easements by necessity, and results in uncertainty as to whether an easement by necessity is a
viable alternative remedy to a private road.
The Wyoming Supreme Court then issued a series of decisions in which
it held that adjudicating an easement by necessity is not a prerequisite to a
private road action. However, the court never held that an easement by
necessity was no longer a viable alternative remedy to a private road.
In McGuire v. McGuire, the county commissioners ruled that a
private road was not necessary under Wyoming Statute section 24-9-101
for reasons outside the scope of the private road statutes. 6 On appeal, the
district court reversed the Board's decision and remanded with instructions to establish a private road. 67
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that, after the commissioners
find that the applicant has procedurally complied with the private road
statutes, a private road must also be necessary under the statutes. 68 According to the court, to meet the requisite statutory necessity for a private
road, one must only demonstrate that his land has no outlet, meaning "no
legally enforceable means by which he can gain access," to a convenient
public road. 69

Constitution. The court held that when the common law conflicts with Wyoming law, Wyoming law

supersedes the common law. Id.
65. Id. at 1046 n.4. "Easement by necessity" and "common law way of necessity" are to be
used interchangeably. The Snell opinion actually uses "common law way of necessity" throughout,
but for purposes of uniformity, the author of this casenote refers to "common law way of necessity"
as "easement by necessity."
66. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1282 (Wyo. 1980). The commissioners reasoned
that the private road was not necessary because the applicants had present access to their property and
the adjoining landowners had not denied this access, the applicants failed to state their purpose for the
road, and adjoining landowners would suffer more from the granting of a private road than refusing
to grant the road. These factors are not relevant to whether a private road is necessary under the private road statutes. Id. The commissioners' ruling also contradicted the parties' stipulation that the
private road applicant's property had no outlet to nor connection with a public road. Id. at 1285.
67. Id. at 1284. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the district court did not have the authority to locate the private road because the legislature placed that authority in the commissioners,
viewers, and appraisers. Id.
68. Id. at 1286.
69. Id. at 1286. The chosen route must not be the most convenient route, but simply a reasonable and convenient route. The court held that the applicant must adequately describe the private
road to be taken. Id. The court also held that a public road under the private road statutes is one that
the public generally is privileged to use. Id. at 1288.
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If, depending on the interpretation of Snell v. Ruppert, an easement
by necessity is a viable alternative remedy to a private road, easements by
necessity could constitute legally enforceable access and render a private
road unnecessary. In McGuire v. McGuire, the court determined that in
Mcllquham, it had implicitly found that a private road is an alternative
remedy to an easement by necessity and does not abrogate easements by
necessity.7' The court did not address whether easements by necessity
constituted legally enforceable access under the private road statutes,
leaving the question unsettled.
In Walton v. Dana, the county commissioners denied a private road
because the applicants already had an unadjudicated easement by necessity
across their grantor's land.7 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
private road statutes do not require a private road applicant to overcome
every obstacle, such as an easement by necessity, before petitioning for a
private road.' It stated that the parties misunderstood the Snell footnote
because the footnote recognizes that one may still choose to pursue an
easement by necessity. 3 The court reasoned that because a landowner
may choose between the two remedies, the county commissioners cannot
compel a private road applicant to pursue an easement by necessity.74 It
held that the applicants in that case had met the requisite statutory necessity for a private road.75
In Bush v. Duff, the Wyoming Supreme Court opened the door to
uncertainty once again.76 The owner of landlocked property' sought an
easement by necessity in the district court, which the district court granted
and assessed damages to compensate for the easement.7" The court, citing
Snell, stated that easements by necessity do not constitute a taking under
the Wyoming Constitution and are available to an owner of landlocked

70. Id. at 1288.

71. 609 P.2d 461, 463 (Wyo. 1980). See Warren R. Darrow, Acquiring Access to Private
Landlocked Tracts: Wyoming's Statutory Right-of-Way, 16 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 281 (1981)
[hereinafter Darrow].

72. Walton, 609 P.2d at 463.
73. Id. at 463 n. 1.
74. Id. at 463.

75. id. at 464.
76.

754 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1988).

77. The common grantor of property in this case financed the sale of parcels of his land to
another, securing the purchase balance with a mortgage. A few of these parcels were left unencumbered by the mortgage, and the buyer conveyed these to Bush and granted him an easement. The
common grantor then foreclosed the mortgage, which extinguished the easement, and left Bush's land
without access. Id. at 160-62.
78. Id. at 162. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court because the district
court had, in effect, established a private road. The court held that establishing private roads is an
action which only the county commissioners are empowered to perform. Id.
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property.7 9 The court reasoned that the common law presumes the parties
intended to convey ingress and egress over the grantor's land to provide
access to the grantee.' However, it held that the sequence of mortgage,
conveyance, and mortgage foreclosure prevented the court from granting
an easement by necessity in that case."'
The Wyoming Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the necessity
issue once and for all in Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray.' The court
began its reasoning by examining the two competing policies surrounding
easements by necessity. First, public policy seeks to ensure that land is
used productively and not wasted by being landlocked.' Second, it is
inequitable to permit a landlocked landowner to claim, without compensation, an easement by necessity across the land of another when access
could have been provided for at the time of conveyance.4 The court
concluded that the private road statutes resolve these competing policies
by providing the grantee his needed access, while compensating the burdened landowner for the taking of his property."
Recognizing that ambiguity may have existed in the Snell and
Walton opinions and that it was perhaps extending its previous holdings,
the court declared that the private road statutes preclude any action for an
easement by necessity.' According to the court, easements by necessity
force a landlocked property owner to choose an illogical, uneconomic,
and unproductive road.' The court reasoned that this is nonsensical and
would result in wasted space and money, as well as road development
problems.'8
The court then disposed of previous confusion regarding the availability of easements by necessity in the Snell, Walton, and Bush opinions.
According to the court, the footnote in Snell, which stated that one may
still choose to pursue an easement by necessity, merely detracted from the
clear language of the opinion. s9 Therefore, the footnote was dicta, and the

79. Id. at 163. Thus, compensation for the access was not required by the Wyoming Constitution.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82.

811 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 1991).

83. Id. at 289.
84. Id. For example, the grantee could have purchased an easement at the time of conveyance.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 289-91.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 289. The court did not elaborate further on this reasoning. Presumably, the court
thought the private road statutes provided the opposite; a convenient and economic remedy.
89. Id.
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opinion's holding was the proper view of the law.' The court also dismissed similar reasoning in Walton as dicta because the court, in that
case, held that the facts were sufficient to establish a private road. 9'
The court then addressed Bush, the only case to hold that easements
by necessity are not takings under the Wyoming Constitution. The court
reasoned that it was actually referring to implied easements in the Bush
case, not easements by necessity.' It went on to state that implied easements and easements by necessity are commonly confused, and that the
distinction between the two is important.93 It failed to address this issue
further, leaving the question open for the court to address in Lindt v.
Murray.9
C. Damages
In Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, the Wyoming Supreme Court
established the constitutional damages standard for determining what
constitutes just compensation for property taken by condemnation under
the state's eminent domain powers. 91 The court held that in eminent domain actions, the proper damages standard is the market value standard,
or the difference between the fair market value of the entire parcel before
the taking and the fair market value of the parcel after the taking.' The
court reasoned that this standard is the most frequently utilized tool to
achieve just compensation.'

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 290 n.2.
93. Id. at 290 n. 1-2 (citing THOMPSON, supra note 46, § 362).
94. Justice Thomas dissented in the opinion, arguing that the prior case law suggested no
constitutional antithesis to easements by necessity. He contended that an easement by necessity is not
a taking under the Wyoming Constitution because it is a doctrine of implied grant and conveyance,
not eminent domain. As a result, the interest goes with the land and is implied in the conveyance, so
the parties do not contemplate payment for the access. According to Justice Thomas, Snell only held
that it was not necessary for the owner of landlocked property to pursue an easement by necessity
prior to invoking the private road statutes. Ferguson Ranch, Inc., 811 P.2d at 291. He criticized the
majority for dismissing footnote four in Snell simply because it "detract[s] from the clear language
used in the body of the opinion." Justice Thomas characterized the majority decision as usurping the
legislative prerogative by extending prior precedents in order to eliminate an easement by necessity as
an alternative remedy to a private road. Id. at 292.
95. Coronado Oil Co., 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982). The court stated that just compensation for property taken by condemnation is an equivalent in money for all property taken. Id. See
generally I JULIUS L. SLACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 1.1 to 2.24 (Rev.
3d. ed.) (1987) [hereinafter NICHOLS].
96. Coronado Oil Co., 642 P.2d at 433. Coronado proceeded under the public eminent domain
statutes, not the private road statutes.
97. Id.
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Problems arise in determining which factors may be considered in

calculating just compensation using the market value standard. Fair market value is not the value to the landowner subject to the taking personally, but is the amount of money that a willing purchaser would pay to a
willing owner considering all uses for which the land is suited.' In deter-

mining fair market value, all factors that affect the fair market value may
be considered." These factors must not be too remote, imaginative, or
speculative" ° and must be causative factors in diminishing the fair market

value of the land. 01
The court held that loss of business," a negligence, trespass, and fear

of remote contingent injuries are not compensable elements of fair market
value under the market value standard.0 3 However, construction, operation, inspection, maintenance and the presence of the easement do affect
fair market value."°4 Factors such as personal inconvenience, mental
anguish, discomfort and annoyance are compensable if they causatively

diminish the fair market value of the land.t05
PRINCIPAL CASE

Chief Justice Golden began the court's decision in Lindt v. Murray
by quoting the text of Wyoming Statute section 24-9-101 (1993)." He
then entered a strongly worded footnote directed at the Wyoming legislature.1,7 Footnote two in the opinion begins by stating that, despite minor
amendments to the procedural and notice requirements of the private road
statutes,1's the "gist" of the statutes has remained the same since 1895.11

98. Id. at 434. See also 4 NICHOLS, supra note 95, § 12.211].
99. Coronado Oil Co., 642 P.2d at 433.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 439. Most often, the parties utilize expert testimony to establish their damage claim.
In proving damages, experts should be qualified by their familiarity with the subject property, other
property in the area, the state of the market, and the sale of similar property in the area to establish a
sound and reasonable basis for the value. Id. at 436.
102. Id. at 435. The court reasoned that when an element of personal loss is interjected, prejudicial elements distort the actual market value. Id.
103. Id. at 438.
104. Id. at 433.
105. Id. at 439. See also 5 NICHOLS, supra note 95, § 18.42. See generally Id. §§ 12.1 to
13.34. For other applications of this standard in Wyoming, see Miller v. Campbell County, 854 P.2d
71, 75 (Wyo. 1993); Energy Transportation Sys., Inc. v. Mackey, 650 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 1982); State
Highway Comm'n v. Scrivner; 641 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1982); Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Irwin Livestock Co., 625 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1981).
106. Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo. 1995).
107. Id.
108. According to the footnote, these amendments occurred in 1901 and 1985. Id. at n.2.
109. Id.
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Chief Justice Golden pointed out that, despite limited opportunities for the
court to review proceedings under the statutes, landowners frequently
utilize the private road procedure."'
In what appears to be a poignant directive, the Chief Justice goes on
to state that "[i]t is obvious that this statute is not up to its assigned task.
Legislative reassessment is imperative.""' The court bases this assessment
on its review of other states' statutes," 2 adding "Wyoming needs a statute
capable of dealing with the complexities associated with development and
progress in an essentially rural state."" 3
The court began its analysis in Lindt v. Murray by rejecting a series
of the Lindts' arguments regarding a potential alternative remedy in the
form of an implied easement." 4
The Lindts first argued that a potential implied easement existed across
Ferguson's land."' Therefore, the potential implied easement negated the
"necessity" for the private road across the Lindts' property." 6 The court
dismissed this argument, recognizing authority to the contrary." 7 It reasoned
that since the legislature intended "convenience and reason" to govern the
private road statutes, such a standard should be applied to the Lindts' arguments. 118 As a result, the court held that substantial evidence supported the
Board's finding that a private road was necessary across the Lindts' land, and
that the Board had conveniently located the private road in a manner that did
the least damage to the Lindts." 9

In light of this holding, the court rejected the Lindts' argument that
both the Board and the district court erred by not considering the potential
implied easement in their respective determinations on whether the private
road was necessary."' The court held that the potential remedy of an
that a private road is
implied easement is not relevant to the determination
2
necessary under the private road statutes.' '

110. Id.
111.

Id.

112. The opinion specifically references NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1713 to -1731 (1993). Id.
113. Lindt, 895 P.2d at 462 n.2.
114. Id. at 462.
115. Id.

116. Id. In theory, the implied easement would constitute legally enforceable access under the
private road statutes, rendering the private road unnecessary.
117. Id. The court did not specify what this authority was.
118. Id.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 462-63.
121. Id. The Lindts also argued that since the Board failed to consider a possible route to the
Murray and Edwards property via an adjoining county, the Board had failed to ascertain facts essen-
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In addition, the Lindts contested the Board's remanded damage
assessment.'2 The court, stating that the Board failed to understand or
observe the district court's instructions on damages, held that the following formula should be applied in private road actions:ln
-

Determine the value of the entirety of the Lindts' affected land before the private road was established;

-

Determine the value of the Lindts' remaining land after
the private road is in place; and

-

Subtract the "after" value from the "before" value.

The court then ordered the district court to remand the damage assessment
to the Board, with instructions to reassemble the previous, or a new
group of viewers and appraisers, in order to re-calculate damages using
the aforementioned formula."2 The court affirmed all other aspects of the
district court's findings, except its assessment of attorney's fees against
the Lindts.'2
ANALYSIS

A. Necessity
In Lindt v. Murray, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that implied
easements are not relevant to the determination that a private road is
necessary under the private road statutes."2 The term "implied easement"
can mean different things in the context of this holding, which ultimately
affects the standard used to determine whether a private road is necessary.
The term implied easement, as it appears in Lindt, could mean quasi
easement. If so, the holding in Lindt means quasi easements are no longer
relevant to whether a private road is necessary. The term implied easement, as it appears in Lindt, could also mean easement by necessity, but
using an implied theory based on the parties' intent at the time of conveytial to properly exercising its authority under the private road statutes. The court dismissed this argument, ruling that the private road statutes did not require such an inquiry. The court also declined to
utilize its supervisory powers over the lower tribunals in this case to force adjudication of the potential implied easement across the Ferguson Ranch property. Id. at 463.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982)).
124. Lind, 895 P.2d at 463.

125. Id. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
126. lindt, 895 P.2d at 462-63.
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ance. 27 If so, the holding in Lindt means easements by necessity based on
an implied theory are not relevant to whether a private road is necessary.
Quasi easements, then, would still be relevant to that determination.
The Wyoming Supreme Court did not elaborate on what it meant by
implied easement in Lindt v. Murray 8 and collateral sources do not add
much clarity to the term. 2 9 Wyoming case law is inadequate because it
characterizes implied easements and easements by necessity inconsistently.
Confusion stems from whether the court is using these terms to analyze
how it characterizes easements by necessity (as a subset of implied ease-

127. Following FergusonRanch, Inc., in which the court seemingly characterized easements by
necessity as a separate type of easement (not an implied easement), the Lindts could have argued that
Murray and Edwards possessed an easement by necessity based on an implied theory. In fact, Murray
and Edwards argued that the court's description of easements by necessity in the Snell and Walton
opinions constituted the classic definition of an "implied" easement. Brief of Appellee, supra note 1,
at 11. Murray and Edwards further suggested that the court equated "implied" easements with easements by necessity in those decisions. Id. Thus, the holding in each case that an easement by necessity was not a prerequisite to a private road applied to, and ultimately resolved the Lindt case. Id.
128. In Lindt v. Murray, the court's only guidance is its reference to similar "modem" statutes
in Nebraska. The Nebraska statutes are more particular in the elements required to obtain access
across another's property, hut do little to solve the current statutory problems in Wyoming: necessity
and damages.
The relevant portions of the Nebraska statutes follow. A county board will provide a hearing
to one who submits an affidavit or petition if:
(1) He or she owns real estate within the county, (2) Such real estate is shut out from
all public access (other than waterways) by being surrounded on all sides by real
estate belonging to other persons or a combination of real estate and water, (3) That
the shut-in landowner is unable to purchase from any surrounding landowners a right
of way to a public road, or that it cannot be purchased except at an exorbitant price,
and (4) the applicant is requesting public access.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1713 (1993).

The applicant must also list the lowest price he can purchase a right of way for. Id. If the
only access to a public road is via a private road, and the requirements of § 39-1713 are met, the
county board will also grant a hearing. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1714 (1993). If the applicant complies
with NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-1713 and 19-1714, the board will grant public access if:
(1) The isolated land was not isolated at the time it was purchased by the owner, (2) the isolation of the land was not caused by the owner or by any other
person with the knowledge and consent of the owner, and (3) that the access is
necessary for existing utilization of the isolated land.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1716 (1993).
129. The Lindts' brief does not clearly communicate their interpretation of the term. The Lindts
argued that the private road statutes and easements by necessity intend to allow one to create access in
the absence of any pre-existing right to other access. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 16. Because
Murray and Edwards allegedly had a pre-existing right to an implied easement created at the severance of the common grantor's property, this pre-existing right renders the private road unnecessary.
Id. at 16-17. The Lindts attempted to distinguish easements by necessity, prescriptive easements and
implied easements, but did so in confusing fashion. The Lindts' analysis of Ferguson Ranch, Inc. and
prescriptive easements is also confusing. Id. at 14-15. They argued that adjudicating the implied
easement first overcomes any confusion the court may have in its treatment of implied easements,
prescriptive easements, or easements by necessity. Id. at 17. See infra notes 132 and 133 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss2/11

16

Forgey: Real Property - Wyoming's Private Road Statutes: Approaching a De

1996

CASENOTES

ments or an entirely separate type of easement), or to delineate quasi
easements and easements by necessity.
For example, in the Snell opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court
seemed to characterize easements by necessity as implied easements based
on the parties' intent at the time of conveyance." 3 However, in Ferguson
Ranch, Inc., the court stated that easements by necessity and implied
easements are distinct, and easements by necessity are a separate type of
easement.' The court, in Ferguson Ranch, Inc., also distinguished the
Bush case because it concerned implied easements, not easements by
necessity. Implied easement in this context probably referred to a quasi
easement (a type of implied easement) because the access sought in Bush
met the elements of a quasi easement.
The most logical conclusion is that the Wyoming Supreme Court
was referring to a quasi easement, rather than an easement by necessity
based on an implied theory, when it used the term "implied easement" in
Lindt v. Murray. The Lindts argued, in a brief submitted to the Board,
that Murray and Edwards possessed unadjudicated access across
Ferguson's land based on Ferguson's prior use of his land to access Section 19." Similarly, in their brief to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the
Lindts argued that Murray and Edwards could enforce the implied easement created by a prior common grantor (Ferguson) at the time the parcels were severed.' 33 Since this claim is based on the grantor's prior use
in accessing the dominant parcel, it more closely resembles a quasi easement, rather than an easement by necessity. Given this context, from
which the Lindts argued the term implied easement, it is apparent that the
court meant implied easement as quasi easement in the Lindt opinion.
Further, if the court had viewed implied easement as an easement
by necessity using an implied theory, it would have held differently in
Lindt. The more logical holding in that instance would be that, in
Ferguson Ranch, Inc., the court eliminated easements by necessity as a
remedy entirely, regardless of how easements by necessity are characterized (as implied easements or a separate type of easement based on

130. Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Wyo. 1975).
131. The court cites THOMPSON, supra note 46, § 362. See supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
132.

Post Hearing Brief at 9,10, Murray and Edwards v. Lindt. This occurred while Ferguson

owned both tracts.
133. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 17-18 (referencing Corbett in conjunction with "implied" easement). The Lindts also stated that Ferguson's parcel was subservient to Murray and
Edwards' parcel for access during the time Ferguson owned both parcels. Id. at 5. This buttresses the
conclusion that the Lindts argued "implied" easement in the context of a "quasi" easement, based on
the prior, apparent, subservient use for access.
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public policy). The court, instead, based the Lindt decision on "convenience and reason."', 34 As a result, it appears that quasi easements are
not relevant to whether a private road is necessary, but remain a viable
alternative remedy.
The impact of this holding is important to the current status of the
private road "necessity" standard. Because the court apparently meant
"quasi easement" when it said "implied easement" in Lindt, the court's
holding, in effect, lowered the necessity required to establish a private
road. 35 By eliminating quasi easements from the private road necessity
determination, the court seems to place the standard below the court's
holding in Ferguson Ranch, Inc. and below what other jurisdictions consider a reasonable necessity.' 36
The court must draw the line somewhere, or necessity becomes circular, which could result in no access being granted to the landlocked party at
all. For example, if quasi easements are relevant to whether a private road is
necessary, the possible existence of a quasi easement renders a private road
unnecessary. However, because necessity is also an element of quasi easements, the possibility, in the alternative, of obtaining private road renders the
quasi easement unnecessary. This results in a "Catch 22."
The court may have extended the line too far in Lindt.'37 There is
little basis in Wyoming case law for the court to apply a "convenience
and reason" standard in Lindt as a basis to eliminate quasi easements from
the private road necessity determination.' There is no legal basis for the
court to lower the private road necessity standard below that of Ferguson
Ranch, Inc. either. The court gave no indication that its opinion in that
case extended beyond easements by necessity.

134. Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo. 1995).

135. The only remaining legally enforceable forms of access that one may consider in determining whether a private road is necessary are express, prescriptive, and implied (from a plat or map)
easements. However, if one possesses an express easement granting him access, it is hard to imagine
a situation in which a private road is also needed.
136. See infra note 137 and accompanying text for other jurisdictions' standards of reasonable
necessity. The Lindt standard is still above the "mere convenience" threshold, but not by much, given
the few remaining easements that have not been eliminated from the necessity determination.
137. In Missouri, one must establish a strict necessity to receive a statutory right of way. JON
W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND, § 4.02[4] (rev.

1995). Generally, courts agree that statutory access provisions do not abrogate the common law, so
property owners may still choose to pursue easements by necessity. Wyoming seems to be the exception here, following Ferguson Ranch, Inc. Courts also generally agree that one cannot obtain statutory
access if an implied easement or easement by necessity can be established. Id. This seems to be the
uniform standard of reasonable necessity for statutory access elsewhere.
138. The standard has never been applied to the necessity issue. It has only been used in the
context of the legislature's intent in enacting the private road statutes. See supra note 69.
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A lower standard of necessity tips the balance in policy between the
need for access and the burden to the servient landowner in favor of the
need for access. By making it easier to obtain a private road, a landowner
can easily burden an adjacent landowner. This increases the risk that a
drastic land use change in the dominant estate may excessively burden the
adjacent landowner.' 39
The Wyoming legislature should be the final arbiter of the necessity
issue. It should legislatively establish a specific standard of necessity as a
prerequisite to obtaining a private road in Wyoming. In doing so, the legislature should determine whether it desires to follow the Wyoming Supreme Court's direction in lowering the necessity for private roads, or
raise the standard to that of other jurisdictions. This determination should
rest on balancing the competing policies surrounding private roads and the
private road statutes.
Specificity in the private road statutes would remove the burden
placed on private road parties and the courts to define the necessity
standard and its function within the private road statutes. As a result, a
Board's decision on whether a private road is necessary will be much
easier, and the statutes will be closer to fulfilling their purpose as a
convenient, economic and time efficient remedy. The relatively few
private road cases appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court deal primarily with the necessity issue, and the need for further appeals on the
issue could be minimized by adding more certainty legislatively to the
private road statutes.
B. Damages
The viewers and appraisers, county commissioners and courts often
have difficulty in applying the damages standard for private road actions
correctly. In Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, the Wyoming Supreme Court
adopted the objective "before and after" market value standard for calculating eminent domain property damages."4 In Lindt v. Murray, the court
139. A subdivision or similar use is an example of such a changed use, and is a relevant concern in Lindt because Murray and Edwards planned to subdivide the Section 19 property. See
Darrow, supra note 71 for relevant policy considerations. However, the lower standard of necessity
encourages landowners to utilize the private road statutes, which compensate the adjacent landowner
for the private road burden, compared to other forms of access which do not compensate the adjacent
landowner. Perhaps this is the court's way of extending the Wyoming Constitution indirectly to other
forms of access beyond easements by necessity. Because quasi easements and easements by necessity
are rooted in the same concepts, the court could conceivably have eliminated quasi easements as a
remedy altogether using the Ferguson Ranch, Inc. constitutional rationale. However, this may have
extended Ferguson Ranch, Inc. too far.
140. 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982).
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adopted the same standard for private eminent domain actions under the
private road statutes.' 4'
The "before and after" market value standard is practical in theory
because it only allows recovery for damages causatively affecting the market
value of the land being taken. However, the standard is difficult to apply.
Confusion and uncertainty stem from what factors the respective
entities may consider in calculating damages, which depends on whether
the factors causatively affect the land's market value. For example, in
Lindt v. Murray, the viewers and appraisers included damages for loss of
privacy, inconvenience due to increased traffic and decreased capabilities,
and the disturbance of livestock, in addition to the value of the land
itself. 42 The district court remanded the calculation because it violated the
Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves standard, so the Board re-calculated the
damages using only the dollars-per-acre figure in the viewers and appraisers report.4 3 The district court affirmed the Board's calculation but the
Wyoming Supreme Court rejected it in the Lindt opinion and remanded it
to the Board for re-calculation.'"
One source that would add more certainty to which factors the viewers and appraisers, and ultimately a Board, may consider in calculating
damages in private road actions is Wyoming's Eminent Domain Act
(Act). 45 In L. U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of
Hot Springs,'" the Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted the Act's damages section and reconciled it with Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves.
L. U. Sheep Co. involved a suit to condemn public access under the
Act, and the district court instructed the jury to assess damages in accordance with Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves. 47 The Wyoming Supreme Court

141.

Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 463 (Wyo. 1995).

142. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at App. #6.
143. Id. at App. #5. This calculation did not consider any additional factors beyond the dollarsper-acre figure.
144. Lindr, 895 P.2d at 463.
145. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-26-101 to -817 (1993). Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves was filed before
the Eminent Domain Act's effective date; therefore, the Act did not apply. Coronado Oil Co. v.

Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 n.4 (Wyo. 1982). Another source that helps clarify which factors are to
be considered in eminent domain damage assessments is Mettee v. Kemp, 696 P.2d 947 (Kan. 1985),

which the Wyoming Supreme Court references in Lindt v. Murray. In Mettee, a Kansas court reviewed that state's eminent domain statute, which specified the factors that can be utilized to calculate

damages. The statute allowed access, use, productivity, view, light and air, trees, destruction of use,
crops, and change of grade to be considered in the damage assessment. Mettee, 696 P.2d at 949.

146. 790 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1990). This was a public eminent domain action under the Eminent
Domain Act. Id. at 665.

147. Id. at 669. Actions under the Act begin in the district court and don't involve the county
commissioners until a later time.
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determined that the Act, contrary to Coronado Oil Co., intended to compensate the landowner subject to the taking for all losses that are attributable to the taking of his land.' Thus, a landowner subject to a partial
taking' 49 under the Act may prove the value of his property rights and the
market value of his property attributable to the taking. '° According to the
Act, the greater of these two values is used as the total compensation to
such a landowner.'
The Wyoming legislature should incorporate a similar standard into
the private road statutes. Uncertainty and difficulty in applying Coronado
Oil Co. causes more appeals, which inhibits the private road process from
operating as the economic, convenient, time efficient remedy the legislature intended it to be. The parties in Lindt v. Murray, eight years later,
are still haggling over what constitutes just compensation for the half-mile
private road across the Lindts' property.' 52
Wyoming's Eminent Domain Act provides a more certain standard for damage assessment because it separates the market value of
the land to be taken and the value of the property rights to be taken.
Separating the two eliminates the difficulty in deciding which factors
causatively affect the lands' market value under Coronado Oil Co.,
which lumped the two together. The Act's standard allows the viewers
and appraisers to simply calculate the market value of the property to
be taken, then consider which property rights are damaged by the
taking, 53and use the greater value as the compensable damage
amount.
The Act also creates a broader, more flexible standard for the landowner subject to the taking to establish the damages attributable to the
taking. More factors, like those the viewers and appraisers felt needed to
be compensated for in Lindt, are compensable under the Act. This broad-

148. Id.

149. A partial taking consists of taking less than the entire parcel of land. Id. at 671.
150. Id.

151. Id. The court held that any rational method of valuation may be used to establish just
compensation as long as the valuation is supported by competent evidence. id.
152. Currently, the parties have chosen three appraisers (one appointed by each side, these two
selecting a third appraiser) to establish damages and end the case. The dispute now centers on whether the date the Board established the private road or the present time is the time of taking that the

appraisers should use to calculate the Lindts' property value. The property has increased in value
since the Board established the private road. Interview with John B. Rogers, Attorney for Murray and
Edwards (Sep. 22, 1995). The private road statutes do not indicate what constitutes the time of taking. However, the Eminent Domain Act states that the date of valuation is the date the action was
commenced. WYO. STAT. § 1-26-703 (1993).
153. L. U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d at 671. Damages still must be supported by competent evidence.
Id. at 672.
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er standard creates a healthier balance between compensation and necessity in private road actions.
By eliminating quasi easements from the determination of whether a
private road is necessary in Lindt, the court made it easier to obtain a
private road. Because the requisite statutory necessity is very low, a landowner can burden adjacent property easily. The burden may be heavy, in
that the dominant estate may drastically change the use of its property to a
subdivision or similar use, which would increasingly interfere with the
burdened landowner's use and enjoyment of his own property. The increase in burden may not be compensable under the Coronado Oil Co.
standard.

*

As a result, one can heavily burden another's property at a low cost,
without compensating for the additional damage to the burdened landowner caused by the changed use. The Act, by allowing more factors to be
considered in determining the damages attributable to the taking of property, allows the landowner to prove the entire amount his property is
burdened by the condemned access, and equals the balance between the
burden and how easily that burden is established.
The Act's damage standard also benefits the landowner who seeks to
take an adjacent landowner's property. Under Coronado Oil Co., the landowner seeking to take property must compensate the landowner subject to the
taking for both the value of the property taken and the damage to all property
rights which causatively diminish the property's market value. The Act, by
separating the two, requires the landowner seeking to take the property to
remit only the greater of the two amounts."'
CONCLUSION

Despite the Wyoming Supreme Court's negative assessment of the
private road statutes, the statutes are not approaching a dead end. However, they do require some re-engineering and additional pavement. Lindt v.
Murray demonstrated two private road problem areas: necessity and
damages. The Wyoming legislature should seize upon the court's invitation in Lindt to reassess the private road statutes.

154. To be compensable, the additional factors must causatively affect the market value, which
limits the number of compensable factors under this standard. See Coronado Oil Co., 642 P.2d at
423; Darrow, supra note 71, at 292 for relevant policy considerations.
155. This is balanced by the fact that the landowner subject to the taking can use more factors
in the property rights damage calculation. See WYo. STAT. § 1-26-702(b)(1993); L.U. Sheep Co.,
790 P.2d at 671.
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The legislature should evaluate the direction the Wyoming Supreme
Court took in Lindt, which lowered the statutory necessity for a private road.
This determination should seek to balance the competing policies surrounding
private roads, as well as make the private road process the convenient, economic, time efficient process the legislature intended it to be.
The legislature should also evaluate the current standard for determining damages in private road actions in order to eliminate confusion
and uncertainty in what factors may be considered in that determination.
One possible source, which has been upheld by the Wyoming Supreme
Court, is Wyoming's Eminent Domain Act. The Act, by separating property rights and market value calculations, eliminates much of the confusion. This, in turn, brings the private road process closer to functioning
as a convenient, economic, time efficient remedy, and also provides a
uniform damages standard for all eminent domain actions.
DANIEL L. FORGEY
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